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THE FILIBUSTER OF WALTER MURRAY GIBSON
By JAMES WARREN GOULD*
One of the most fascinating characters in Hawaiian history is Walter
Murray Gibson, premier of the independent kingdom of Hawaii from 1882
until he was forced from office five years later. Before he went into Hawaiian
politics Gibson was a Mormon missionary and world traveller. Little is
known about his early life. This is partly because we have two versions of
his story, the one written by his enemies—he had many—who paint him as
a villainous adventurer, and the other written by himself. His own story of
his early life, The Prison of Weltevreden, is a romantic tale of injured in-
nocence. The writer of this article has gone to the diplomatic files of the
foreign office in The Hague and in Washington to trace the official story of
Gibson's adventure in the East Indies. It is presented here in the hope that
it will throw new light on his later career.
Filibustering Origins.—The history of American filibusters has omitted
the story of Walter Murray Gibson. This is undoubtedly because of a lack
of knowledge of American interests in Sumatra and in Southeast Asia gen-
erally. The fact that Gibson's case does not fall within the traditional area of
Latin America may account partially for its having been overlooked.1 Pos-
sibly that geographic limitation of filibustering is too narrow, as Gibson had
all the other earmarks of an American filibusterer. He fitted the description
of being ambitious and romantic and interested in ruling a tropical govern-
ment. He had an egotistical confidence in his own Tightness, and he was a
Southerner.2 Like others of his kind, he seems to have been motivated
basically by that romantic spirit of adventure which, after the end of Amer-
ican territorial expansion in 1848, found continued expression in filibustering.
Gibson's early experiences were suggestive of filibustering as a review
of his early life reveals.3 The place and date of his birth have always been
in doubt. In later years the story that he was born of American parents in
1822 aboard a Spanish vessel in the Bay of Biscay was generally accepted.4
But he celebrated his sixtieth birthday on January 16, 1884, with an elaborate
and largely attended reception fully reported at the time in the Honolulu
newspapers5 and in his youth he once swore in court to having been born in
Keerslaw or Courtlow, Northumberland, England.6 Some of his discussions
* The author is Associate Professor of International Relations, Claremont Men's
College, Claremont, California. The paper is a revision of one chapter of his doctoral
dissertation on "American Interests in Sumatra 1784-1873," presented at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy in 1955.
with the State Department also indicated British birth. Whatever his nativity,
it is agreed that he was brought to the Unied States as a small boy, and that
he lived in New York, New Jersey, and South Carolina.7 He was married at
fifteen, but his wife died five years later leaving him with three small children.
He soon left them to go adventuring. During most of the 1840's he was
interested in Central America. He planned an expedition to Mexican Cali-
fornia in 1843, lived with the exiled Mexican dictator Santa Anna after 1845,
and followed General Scott's Army from Vera Cruz to Mexico City in 1847.8
After making some money in California he returned to Washington where,
through Chevalier Gomez, he became Consul General for several Central
American states. In those days that meant diplomatic representation.9 At-
tracted by the idea of forming the nucleus of a Guatamalan navy for General
Rafael Carrera,10 he bought a schooner from the American Minister to
Mexico, James Gadsden, for $35OO.11 Ironically, the vessel was the former
United States revenue schooner Flirt which had been active against the first
Lopez filibustering expedition to Cuba.12 Because Gibson armed the schooner
in New York City, the United States Marshall declared he had violated
American neutrality laws,13 and forced Gibson to abandon both the arms
and the Guatamalan scheme. Gibson then headed for Brazil with an innocent
cargo of ice. An exciting trip involving mutiny and charges of piracy ended
at Maceio, Brazil, where he tried to sell the Flirt ^  Gibson does not seem to
have been concerned whether the buyer was legitimate or a rebel government.
Offers of charters to run the Brazilian blockade into Buenos Aires and to
run up the Amazon were frowned upon by the Brazilian government,15 and
Gibson only escaped arrest by taking refuge in the British Vice Consulate
at Maceio.16
Up to this point, Gibson's career shows close resemblances to that of a
filibusterer. Was he likely to change merely for the lack of opportunity in
Latin America? In Pernambuco he met a Scot, Charles Graham, who had
served in British India and had sailed in the Far East.17 Gibson claims to
have been inspired to go to the Indies by boyhood stories told by a seafaring
uncle and a wealthy planter,18 but Graham's practical knowledge was probably
the major stimulus to their departure for the Indies.
Arrival in Sumatra.—Gibson first saw Sumatra on December 25, 1851,
as the Flirt entered the Straits of Sunda, and he acted like a conquistador
when he set his foot on Sumatran soil on New Year's Day, 1852. His first
port of call was Muntok, Banka which he was forced to enter on January 5
due to a storm. Gibson frankly admitted that he was unlike other Americans,
for he "saw more in these islands than cargoes for ships."19 What were his
ambitions? He tells us this was a time when "the world had heard of the
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labors and wise policy of Sir James Brooke."20 Even old maids could say:
"Many a youthful heart . . . beat with the desire to imitate the Rajah of
Sarawak."21 Persons who knew Gibson in later life described him as politi-
cally ambitious. Did he decide to try for his own Sultanate? Gibson tipped
his hand to the Dutch Resident of Banka, Schaap. He defended the Lopez
filibuster in Cuba and talked about his "kingdom" in the Indies.22 While in
Banka, Gibson met a half-breed Balinese, Captain William Valberg, who
invited Gibson to accompany him to Palembang whence he was transporting
Dutch troops to suppress a rebellion.23 Considering Gibson's background
it is not unreasonable to assume that he saw in the revolution an opportunity
to fulfill his ambitions.24
This revolt had begun in January 1850 in the Marga (tribal district)
of Bulan Tengah, Musi Hulu.25 The Dutch admitted (to themselves, of
course) that their own maladministration had caused the revolt. Specifically,
the natives lacked respect for the local Dutch administrator, Captain Meyer,
who ruled the area as a military governor and in ignorance of local customs
and language. He had blunderingly changed local rulers. The second reason
was the Dutch demand of December 1851 for delivery of 150 forced laborers.
This meant seven per cent of the males in a total population of 5,380.
Once started, the revolt "spread like fire" throughout the area, and partic-
ularly to the Ampat Lawang district. The revolt became so serious that when
the hated garrison commander was besieged, the Indies government had to
take "stern measures."26 An expedition to suppress the revolt in late 1851
failed due to serious illness among Dutch troops.27 By early January of 1852
the Dutch position was desperate. The rebels controlled the interior of
Sumatra while the Dutch military governor de Brauw waited powerless until
reinforcements arrived from Batavia.28 Thus, Gibson arrived at a time when
the Dutch position was most critical.
Gibson's "Treason."—Gibson arrived at Palembang on January 17, 1852,
and within a day allowed himself to be seen with a native who was an old
enemy of the Dutch, and who appealed to Gibson for aid.29 Although Gibson
protested the innocence of such meetings, he openly admitted that he was
aware that his arrival "prompted overtures of desertion and rebellion on the
part of disaffected soldiers and vessels."30 He studiously ignored all friendly
warnings that the visits of the natives, who were begging for his aid, were
interpreted by the Dutch as an effort to extend American influence in
Sumatra.31 In fact everything he did seems to have encouraged Dutch fears
that the Americans were going to place obstacles in the way of increased
Dutch power, a suspicion which the English had been trying to arouse since
1850 at least.32 Gibson let the Dutch know his adulation for Rajah Brooke,
for he said later that he indulged "in bravadoes that I would become a
potentate in the east."33 He really made the Dutch furious, he later told a
correspondent of the New York Herald, by running the American flag up
on a 120-foot pole over the residence of a native chieftain, "unquestionably the
first time the stars and stripes were displayed in this part of Sumatra."34
Gibson's final undoing was putting his thoughts into writing. On February
4 he dictated a letter to be sent to the Sultan of Djambi. The following text
of that letter may be considered authoritative since it is the English translation
which Gibson later sent to President Fillmore, admitting that it corresponded
with the original:
I am able to assist you Sultan in all your wishes, as the American
government has abundance of powder, shot, muskets and blunder-
busses. I want to make all the Malays free, and I do not like all the
Dutchmen . . . the American government has plenty of steamers and
ships of war: there are plenty of both; You need not fear Sultan—
The whole upper districts of Jambie and Palembang I will put in good
order. If it is possible all Dutchmen must be killed. In a few days I
can be with you and take possession of this Empire?5
Gibson later denied having dictated this particular letter, saying he had
dictated only a letter of introduction for his mate, Graham. Several things
argue against such a story: 1) He did not deny the authenticity of the
original in sending it to President Fillmore in April, 1853. 2) It is im-
probable that he signed a forgery since he said he had the aid of a Malay
dictionary and therefore knew the portent of the words.36 Gibson maintained
that the "inflamatory" words were inserted by his scribe, a Dutch spy, and
that he signed the forgery when drunk. Some credibility was given to this
story by the decision of the Dutch Council of the Indies that he had been
the victim of a plot of his scribe to betray him.37 Even so, the scribe could
not have been the sole author, for the document showed too remarkable a
knowledge of Gibson's ambitions to have been made up out of whole cloth.
It is probable that Gibson did dictate a letter offering assistance which the
scribe touched up for the benefit of his masters, the Dutch.
Graham was sent off to Djambi on the night of February 4 in a most
surreptitious fashion to be carrying a mere letter of introduction.38 He got
no more than ten miles up the Musi River, to Pulo Karta, when the Dutch
police, tipped off by the scribe of course, caught him and brought him back
to Palembang. Armed with the tell-tale letter, the Dutch boarded the Flirt
the next day and arrested Gibson as its author. He later claimed that, at the
time of the arrest, a Dutch lieutenant cried "Haul down your flag, you
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damn Yankee insurrectionaire," and when he refused to do so, tore it down
and threw it into the river. The account is rendered suspicious by the fact
that secret Dutch files, which might contain an admission of any such action,
show complete innocence of the incident.39 Furthermore, Gibson completely
failed to mention this incident to the American Consul or to an American
naval officer during his later trials.40 If the event occurred at all, it may
have happened when he ran up the flag on Dutch soil.
Colonel de Brauw concluded from looking at the letter that Gibson's
object in coming to Sumatra was "to play the role of James Brooke." Point-
ing to the dangers if he had ever reached Djambi or Ampat Lawang, the
Colonel concluded that Gibson was guilty of "high treason against the
Netherlands Government and deserves the death penalty."41 The Colonel
had a friendly chat with Gibson in jail the next day and claims to have
induced him to confess his ambitions. Gibson supposedly admitted that he
was a member of a group of roving youths out for adventure, and when he
learned in Banka of the Palembang rising decided to try for adventure there.
The Colonel said, "He told me that he always wanted to enter into the service
of a native prince, in order to help him against his oppressors" and play
the role of James Brooke, if not in Sumatra some other island.42
Gibson's Trials
The first release.—Gibson was placed aboard the Dutch government
steamer Ardjceno and shipped to Batavia to be tried for treason. The Dutch
case was made difficult by the drowning of ten government witnesses. An
account of this, the details of which could have come only from Gibson,43
says that Gibson's friend Valberg hired himself as a steersman of a gov-
ernment boat on the Musi, tipped it over and drowned ten of the highest
Dutch officials in Sumatra, including a major, three captains, the Treasurer
of the Province and the Commissioner of the Sumatra Army.
When the case came up for trial on February 21, 1852, before the Batavia
Court of Justice, it was thrown out because of the illegality of Gibson's arrest
by military authority, and he was released.44 It could hardly be expected
that he would not be rearrested under proper procedures, but Gibson
ignored advice to escape during his short liberation, choosing to wait and
attempt to get back his schooner. Warned by the Dutch of his imminent
rearrest, he was led to believe that if he signed an appeal of clemency he
might be pardoned by Governor-General Duymaer van Twist. Accordingly,
on February 25, 1852, he signed a confession, the heart of which was that
he had acted rashly in talking with the natives and signing the letter and
indulging "in bravadoes, that I would become a potentate in the east." I have
seen the original of this document, and it certainly looks genuine enough
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as it is in Gibson's own hand and signature.45 Gibson never denied its
authenticity, and in fact showed how much importance he attached to it by
having a copy secretly removed from State Department files, as we shall see
later. However, we cannot feel confident that the Governor-General acted
fairly in this instance, for the confession was later used to convict Gibson.
Second acquittal.—Formal trial commenced on the day Gibson signed
the confession. After review of the case by the highest authorities in the
Indies, Governor-General van Twist reluctantly agreed with his Council on
March 24, 1852, on what was a very generous appraisal of the case. They
believed that Gibson was probably a victim of the Dutch spies and that he
did not understand the contents of the letter he signed. They felt he prob-
ably had sinister designs, but since the schemes did not succeed, no crime
had been committed.46
The Governor's orders to release Gibson turned out to be a mere formality,
for the Governor-General wrote to The Hague on the same day that "it is
time to make an example, if possible, so that adventurers of such ilk are
induced to more prudence."47 Accordingly the Governor-General had the case
appealed to the Supreme Court which involved further delay. This was an
extremely unfortunate decision since it substantiated Gibson's claims that
the Dutch were out to get him under any circumstances.
Gibson lost confidence in the American Commercial Agent in Batavia,
A. A. Read, after he heard that he had said "We have too many of these
revolutionary fanatics in America—hang him."48 Read left Batavia shortly
after Gibson's arrival, and his successor, a Dutch citizen, had no power to
exercise consular function because of being unrecognized by the Dutch gov-
ernment. Finding his government so poorly represented in Batavia, Gibson
then sent every American authority in the Far East a story of injured in-
nocence. One of these appeals reached the East India Squadron Commander
John H. Aulick in Hongkong. Showing that reluctance of naval officers
to leave cooler waters that has been previously mentioned, Aulick thought
of several excuses not to go to Batavia. Then, as an afterthought, he decided
to send the sloop St. Mary's.*9 Aulick ordered Commander George A.
Magruder to investigate Gibson's case and "use every proper effort to relieve
him from his difficulties—or at least see that he has justice done to him."50
As soon as the news reached Batavia that the Navy was coming, Gibson
detected a marked difference in the Dutch attitude. The Dutch released
Gibson's crew and gave him more liberties. He claims it was hinted that
if he escaped the government would be happy and only a "sham search"
would be made. However, he refused his chance again, counting on naval
support to get his schooner back.51
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During his visit at Batavia from July 7 to 17, 1852, Commander Magruder
was received by the Dutch with such obsequious gestures as an offer of coal
for Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan which the Dutch were known
to oppose.52 Finding Gibson in "comfortable quarters" in prison, contrary
to Gibson's later allegations, Magruder then went to Bogor to visit the
Governor-General. Although Duymaer van Twist professed to be willing
to give all the facts, he suppressed from Magruder his determination to
make an example of Gibson and concealed the way Gibson's "confession"
had been obtained.53 Although Magruder left Batavia convinced of Gibson's
innocence he had a Dutch assurance that the case would be decided quickly
and "without the least influence of anyone whatever."54 In the fulfillment
of these promises the Governor-General was greatly remiss. When a second
trial resulted in acquittal on August 25, 1852, Gibson was rearrested. The
hypocrisy of the government was apparently not lost on the Dutch in
Batavia. One may doubt the reliability of Gibson's statement that his counsel
F. A. Mees said that he had never seen "such arbitrary proceedings."55 How-
ever, these sentiments are supported by Magruder's statement that public
opinion in Batavia favored Gibson.56
Meanwhile, in Washington, the State Department found no reason to
take action. The first official news of Gibson's case came from the American
Legation in The Hague which delayed action by promising further infor-
mation.57 The information finally supplied by the Dutch gave such an un-
favorable impression of Gibson that the American Minister could only rec-
ommend no "interference at present."58 Reports from Aulick passed to the
State Department indicated at first that the Navy was going to investigate
and later that Magruder had assurances of Gibson's being fairly treated.59
Thus, there was no reason for Washington to do anything.
Find trials.—When Gibson had been in jail for a year without being
legally sentenced, and in fact had been acquitted for the third and fourth
times, on August 25 and December 22, 1852, his appeals reached Humphrey
Marshall, American Commissioner in China. Marshall examined the papers
Gibson had sent him and concluded that they "afford strong persuasive
evidence that if his hand has not executed, his heart conceived, a course of
action exceedingly reprehensible upon the part of an American citizen."60
Marshall nevertheless discussed with Aulick the sending of another warship
to Batavia. Aulick used the old Navy excuse of having to leave for home.61
The fifth decision, on February 25, 1853, was again in Gibson's favor.62
In what can be justified by no interpretation of a system of appeals, since
there were only two courts involved, Gibson was arrested a fifth time and
the case sent to the Supreme Court. Gibson's counsel explained the reason
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for this as being Duymaer van Twist's determination to sentence him to
death lest his acquittal encourage rebellion in the islands. The counsel
learned that the Attorney General had told the Indies Council that Gibson
was a secret agent of the American Government and "hence it was the more
important to make a signal example of this first attempt of the American
Government or American people to encroach upon the dominions of the
Netherlands in the manner of the Cuban invasion."63
Duymaer van Twist finally got a decision against Gibson by the Supreme
Court of the Indies on May 3, 1853. The court found him guilty of "high
treason" and condemned him to twelve years imprisonment after half an
hour exposure on the gallows.64
Gibson feared, with apparent good reason, that the Dutch might hang
him, and did not wait to hear the sentence. On April 25, 1853, he escaped
from prison to the American ship N. B. Palmer, on which he returned to
the United States.
The status of Djambi.—Although circumstantial evidence pointed clearly
to Gibson's intention to filibuster in Sumatra, the Dutch courts had a difficult
time convicting him legally. First of all, it was rather questionable whether
an alien could commit "treason." Secondly, although there was plenty of
evidence that Gibson planned a filibuster, he never carried it out.65 Under
the Dutch law, intention was not a crime. Thirdly, the Sultan of Djambi,
with whom he conspired, was not under Dutch sovereignty. At the time of
Gibson's arrest, Colonel de Brauw referred to Djambi as a kingdom (ryk).
The Dutch had no troops or government there and the only sovereignty
they exercised was collection of customs.66 The relations between the Nether-
lands and Djambi were governed by the Treaty of December 15, 1834, which
Michiels had extorted from the Sultan. Under Article three of that treaty,
the Sultan had placed himself "under the immediate protection and authority
of the Netherlands Indies Government, and promised to enter into no
friendly relations with enemies of that Government." The Dutch later ad-
mitted that this obviously did not prevent Djambi from making treaties
with friendly powers or individuals such as Gibson.67 In fact the Dutch
claim to sovereignty was admittedly so weak that it was only with the aid
of military force that they were later able to obtain an explicit admission
of subjection from the Sultan.68
The Prodigal Son Returns
Gibson's claim.—On July 27, 1853, Gibson returned to New York and
started to work to get reparation.69 The best prediction of Gibson's chances
were made by a British citizen: "though Mr. Gibson, has certainly received
such treatment from the Dutch Authorities as should not be permitted to
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pass unnoticed, he would do well to confine himself to facts, as otherwise
it will prejudice his claims . . ."70
Word of Gibson's fifth successful trial having reached the United States
before his return, Secretary of State William L. Marcy had instructed the
new American chief of mission in The Hague, Charge d'Affaires August
Belmont, that one of his first acts on arrival in The Hague was to take up
Gibson's case, and to make an "earnest demand . . . for the immediate trial
or discharge of Mr. Gibson" if he had not yet escaped.71 Before Belmont
reached The Hague, Gibson had escaped, and had presented his grievances
to Marcy.72 The Secretary gave him full access to State Department and
Navy reports, and on August 22 Gibson came up with a claim of $100,000,
half of it for the loss of his $3500 schooner.73 Marcy sent Gibson's state-
ments off to Belmont with orders to request indemnity if the claim were
found correct.74
Marcy may have regretted his support of Gibson. Soon afterward, he
heard from a New York friend that Gibson was "totally unworthy of the
protection of his government."75 Marcy then asked the persons listed by his
informant for an estimate of Gibson's character, and received a rash of un-
favorable replies describing Gibson in such terms as "unprincipal[ed]
villain," "pirate" and "swindled."76 Gibson at once came back with a rec-
ommendation from James L. Orr, the influential United States Representative
from South Carolina and later Speaker of the House.77 Within the State
Department, Marcy was advised that Dutch persistence in trying to convict
Gibson rendered the allegiance of Djambi suspicious, and their case question-
able.78 Therefore the case was continued, and Gibson had won the first
round.
Meanwhile Belmont had presented the claim during his first business
meeting with the Netherlands Foreign Minister van Hall on October 12.
Van Hall said he knew of the case, but wanted to get all of the details. He
assured Belmont that the case would be fully investigated and justice done
if Gibson had been wrongly dealt with. Belmont took little hope from these
promises, judging from American experience with Dutch delays on previous
claims.79 After getting the American charges in writing, van Hall passed
the papers on to the Minister of Colonies, C. F. Pahud, suggesting that the
matter be disposed of quickly to avoid difficulties with the United States.80
Dutch delays.—With what can hardly be considered speed, Minister of
Colonies Pahud finally got off a request to the Governor-General on No-
vember 15, 1853. In his letter he did ask for examination of the American
charges with "the greatest care" and speed. He was careful to avoid criticism
of the Indies handling of the case but suggested that possibly the Indies
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officials should be just a little more careful in handling strangers.81 This
cautious attitude is indicative of the remarkably independent power of the
Governor-General.
Belmont hardly guessed how long a wait he faced, and was back at the
Plein (Foreign Office) on October 24 for a reply. Van Hall told him, in-
correctly, that Batavia had been instructed to inquire about the matter and
that they could do nothing until they received an answer.82
Belmont also brought up the question of the absence of consuls in the
Indies, a deficiency that had been emphasized by the inability of the un-
recognized agents to give Gibson any official support. Van Hall gave no
encouragement, citing the traditional Dutch arguments of consular "influence
and interference" and abuse of privileges that would do credit to a Russian
argument for the "Iron Curtain" today. Belmont settled down to a wait of at
least four or five months. He confided to James Buchanan, his friend and
colleague in London, that the Dutch would probably drag the thing on for
years—maybe twenty, like the previous claim. He remarked, "The Dutch
are slow in everything, but particularly when it comes to paying."83
Commodore Perry's reaction.—Belmont's letter to Buchanan suggests that
he was a bit bored with the letdown of business after his first diplomatic
adventure.84 He decided to write his friend Commodore M. C. Perry to
suggest that he go down to Batavia to get the facts on Gibson while waiting
to go back to Japan in the spring of 1854.85 Belmont became rather an-
noyed about Dutch obstruction of Perry's visit to Japan and suggested that if
it came to war the United States might liberate the Indies from the Dutch.
What he said exactly was that,
with half a dozen American ships of war it would be an easy thing to
revolutionize the whole Dutch Archipelago, the unfettered trade of
which would be at least fully worth as much for our countrymen, as
what we may reap from the opening of the Japanese ports.
He went on to mention the iron and coal deposits of Sumatra as an attrac-
tion.86
Perry did not go any farther south than Macao in 1853, but Belmont's
appeals apparently found some sympathy. In his documents we find the
following statement:
the day will however arrive, and at no distant period, when political
events and the unanimous and urgent appeals of our commercial men,
will make it obligatory on the United States to look with greater
solicitude to our eastern commerce, and to extend the advantages of
our national friendship and protection, as well to Japan and Lew
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Chew as to other powers but little better known to Western Nations.
I may refer to Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China, and parts of Borneo and
Sumatra . . .87
He went on to scoff at European claims to dominate broad areas of the world,
and with clear reference to Balestier's Borneo Treaty and Gibson's connection
with Djambi, said:
It should not be admitted because England, Holland, or Spain may
hold an insignificant part of a kingdom or province, that their lawful
sovereignty should be extended by consequence over the whole country.
And so in regard to Borneo and Sumatra; have we not the same right
to negotiate with the native princes as England and Holland claim to
have?9'8
While Belmont waited for a reply from the Dutch, Gibson went around
the eastern United States drumming up support for his claim, and spreading
a great deal of information about Sumatra.89 He went down to the grass
roots, and induced the citizens of his old home towns, Anderson and Pendle-
ton, South Carolina, to petition Congress for action on his claim.90 Repre-
sentative Orr presented the petitions in a speech to the House of Repre-
sentatives on May 25, 1854, and they were referred to the Foreign Relations
Committee.91 Gibson also was engaged to the daughter of the influential Dr.
Lindlay and was getting considerable congressional support.92
Van Hall finally got around to handing Belmont a tentative reply on
March 1, 1854, which in effect rejected the claim, but still held out hope
of getting final word from the Indies.93 At the same time van Hall started
other methods to dispose of the claim. He sent one of his most promising
young diplomats to Washington in the new position of Minister, when the
post had only been held by a charge. Belmont was inexperienced enough
only to be flattered that he would receive a commensurate promotion to full
Minister.94 Van Hall also held out some hope of admission of consuls to the
Indies, which he later made contingent upon abandonment of the Gibson
claim.95
Gibson's "Mission" to Europe
Anticipating that the final Dutch reply would be negative, Belmont
pressed the Secretary of State for further instructions. Marcy assured him
that he wanted the wrongs "adjusted . . . speedily and amicably." He said,
"You are now instructed to press the matter temperately but resolutely upon
the Dutch Government, urging immediate and ample reparation for the
outrages committed."96 Marcy accepted a suggestion from Gibson that he
personally carry these instructions to The Hague and help Belmont with the
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claim. Before leaving, Gibson got a letter of introduction (from President
Pierce, he claimed) to Judge Don Pyott, then Secretary of Legation at Paris.97
It was solely on the basis of this that Gibson later let it be understood that
he was sent to Europe as a special agent of President Pierce.98
Gibson arrived in The Hague soon after the trial documents had come in
from Batavia, " and van Hall presented his final rejection of the claim to
Belmont.100 Gibson probably helped Belmont draft the reply to this rejec-
tion. It was a very well-reasoned, if somewhat inaccurate, note. It con-
cluded with Marcy's own words that the American government expected a
"speedy and amicable adjustment of this claim."101 Fully expecting a nega-
tive reply to this, Belmont again asked Marcy for further instructions. He
suggested that arbitration seemed the most likely prospect.102
Van Hall had softened the refusal for Belmont by presenting a draft of
a convention admitting American consuls to the Indies.103 His gesture to
Gibson was returning his private papers. Ever since his return home, Gibson
had been storming for the return of the private papers which the Dutch had
retained after his trial.104 Marcy had acceded to Gibson's demand that the
Dutch be asked to return them, and Belmont had presented the request to
van Hall.105 The Minister of Colonies sent the papers to van Hall with the
trial documents. But in a colossal blunder, van Hall had given Gibson all
of the trial documents and secret letters of the Indies Government. Each
minister apparently assumed that the other had taken out all official docu-
ments and did not bother to look over the contents himself. One can imagine
Gibson's delight to find all of the Dutch evidence of the use of spies and
the administrative interference for his conviction.106 The blunder was not
discovered by the Dutch for over a month. Van Hall was then put in the
awkward position of having to ask for the return of the incriminating
documents.107
Gibson had in the meantime left the Netherlands. He apparently feared
that he might be arrested by the Dutch if he remained in The Hague alone.108
In a typically Gibsonian act, he left his card with the Minister of Colonies
as he departed. Pahud interpreted this as an act of defiance and then did
threaten to arrest him if he returned.109 Gibson went to Paris, where, by
"attaching" himself to Secretary of Legation Don Pyott, he fraudulently as-
sumed the title of "attache." By getting an official denial of Gibson's attache
title from Paris, van Hall was able to prove to Belmont that Gibson was not
reliable and to weaken Belmont's confidence in Gibson's claim.110
At the request of the Dutch, Belmont wrote Gibson to return the Dutch
official papers and got the answer that he wanted a list of those desired. He
hoped, one may suppose, to get an official authentication and admission of
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the existence of the documents which he intended to copy before returning.111
The Dutch had to admit that they did not even know the contents of the
file since even the inventory had been sent to Gibson. They suggested that
Gibson go over the papers together with them.112 The documents never
were returned.113
The United States Threatens War
Between July 4 and September 7 Belmont had no reply to his last note
to van Hall for "speedy" adjustment. Finally, on September 1 van Hall
told him to expect a reply. Belmont still had no instructions from Marcy
about what to do in event of a refusal. In the meantime Gibson was exerting
pressure by sending scurrilous attacks against Belmont and Marcy to the
American newspapers.114 Although Gibson was apparently satisfied when
he left The Hague, he was annoyed by Belmont's refusal to give him a loan
of $500 on the strength of his claim.115
The arrival of Assistant Secretary of State Ambrose Dudley Mann in
Europe on August 19 must have been an answer to Belmont's prayers.116
Mann's principal purpose in coming was the settlement of the Soule affair,
which led to the famous Ostend Conference. However, American news-
papers hinted that Mann was concerned with the settlement of other matters
including the Gibson claim.117 The truth of these reports is suggested by
Marcy's statement that Mann took Gibson's dossier with him to Europe.118
Upon his arrival in Paris, Mann wrote Belmont that he would like to see him
in Paris, although he had no official instructions to give him. Belmont re-
plied that he could not come since he was expecting van Hall's reply.119 It
was probably in this letter that Belmont mentioned his anxiousness to receive
instructions from Marcy.120
About September 3, Mann had a talk with Gibson, who gave the impres-
sion that Beknont was criticising the State Department for not instructing
him to be "more exacting" with the Dutch and thus settle the claim. Mann
wrote to Marcy that he would only refer Belmont to his previous instructions
which he "considered sufficiently explicit."121
At just this time Belmont was called to Paris by Daniel E. Sickles to
receive a personal invitation from President Pierce to attend the Ostend
Conference.122 Despite Mann's promise to refer Belmont to previous in-
structions, the latter seems to have left Paris with a new idea of throwing
down the gauntlet to the Dutch on the Gibson claim. After meeting Sickles
on September 4, Belmont said he saw only Mason, Mann, Pyott, and Gibson.
He said he received no advice or instructions from anyone.123 Had Mann
forgotten to advise Belmont as he had promised Marcy to do, or did he advise
Belmont differently? Belmont's correspondence shows a reluctance to act
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without official approval, so it is probable that Mann approved Gibson's
demand to threaten the Dutch. The diplomatic language in which Belmont
phrased his note also suggests Mann's experienced guidance. That Mann
did not refer Belmont to his previous instructions is suggested by external
and internal evidence. In the letter to Marcy Mann expresses what appears
to be his own opinion that the Dutch "will yield if pressed." External evidence
is the lack of frankness with which Mann dealt with Marcy during this
trip over the Soule and Ostend affairs.
On his return from Paris, Belmont was handed the Dutch reply to the
note of July 4.124 To this Belmont replied that he saw no point to further
correspondence since his latest note was "quite as unadmissable" as the others.
He concluded, "it now only remains for my government to take such measures
for the enforcement of Mr. Gibson's claim, as it may deem fit and proper
in the premises."125
Belmont was quite aware that the tenor of his note suggested war. He
told Marcy that he "hinted most unequivocally to your determination to
resort to ulterior measure, in order to obtain redress for the wrongs suffered
by Mr. Gibson."126 Why would he say "your determination" when he had
received no instructions from Marcy, unless someone who had come from
Marcy (like Mann) had given him this impression? Belmont seems to have
had some doubts about Marcy's support, since he wrote Marcy privately that
the "energetic note, which while it contains a sufficient threat, does not
hamper in any way your private action in the matter."127
The implied threat of war not unnaturally caused a stir in the Dutch
cabinet. After consulting the King, van Hall decided to call Belmont's bluff.
Pretending that his knowledge of English was too poor to understand what
the threatening words meant, he politely asked Belmont for a clarification.
He said that he certainly did not think that the words implied a threat,
considering the ancient friendship between the two countries.128 The ruse
worked. Still without written instructions from Marcy, Belmont backed down,
saying that he did not see how his note could possibly have hurt Dutch
feelings.129 However, to Marcy, Belmont continued to urge the necessity
of "coercive measures" to enforce the claim. Another reference to Marcy's
determination "to resort to reprisals" implied Mann's intermediacy since
Marcy's instructions are non-existant.130
Back in Washington Marcy finally heard from a "private source" (prob-
ably a private letter of Mann's) that Belmont was waiting for instructions.
Marcy decided to take up the matter with President Pierce, but was surprised
to find that Gibson's dossier was missing from the files.131 He then had to
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wait until the return of Mann who had "principle management of Gibson's
claim."132
"When Marcy received Belmont's complaint about lack of instructions
on October 3, he replied in annoyed tones that he had not expected to send
Belmont any instructions until the Dutch refused finally, and that he felt
besides that the Dutch had made some pretty strong arguments.133 Marcy
gave no instructions for strong measures, and did not even hint that he
knew he was expected to suggest such measures. Marcy's skepticism of
Gibson's claim, his annoyance with Belmont's eagerness, and irritation with
Mann's removal of the dossier strengthen the supposition that Mann pushed
Belmont to write the threatening note.
Van Hall's sigh of relief at Belmont's backing down was almost audible
in his grateful reply of September 22.134 Even the king of the Netherlands
obliquely suggested to Belmont how relieved he was about the outcome.135
But the battle was only half over. News of the threat of war had leaked to
the Dutch press and the fate of the Ministry seemed in doubt for a while.
When the Ministry's speech from the throne, which is like the State of the
Union address in the United States, on September 26 referred to amicable
foreign relations, opposition delegates in both houses of parliament took
exception to the statement on the basis of the Gibson case.136 Van Hall
saved his own skin by saying that Belmont's letter was not hostile and "en-
forcement" did not mean force or violence. As far as Belmont's present
views were concerned, van Hall was right. The Ministry was also attacked
for what one Dutch paper called "stupidity" of giving Gibson the official
papers.137 Van Hall admitted this was an error but blamed the bureaucrats.
After all, he said, you could not blame a minister for such a thing or else
clerks could give away documents and get ministers into trouble all the time!
In attacking the Ministry, the opposition was far from favorable to
Gibson. They criticized the government for allowing him to escape from
Batavia and for not arresting him in The Hague.138 Van Hall's reply to
this last criticism incorrectly implied that he had frightened Gibson off with
a threat of arrest. This brought Gibson back to The Hague in defiance. Al-
though Gibson made sure he was not arrested by staying only a day, and
then in Belmont's house, he found a way to retaliate against van Hall. He
turned over to the opposition press copies of the belligerent correspondence
between Belmont and van Hall.139 However, in doing this, Gibson did
himself a disservice, for Belmont regarded it was a "flagrant betrayal of
confidence." The scurrilous reports which the New York Herald was then
printing about Belmont's doing banking in his Legation, which Gibson did
not deny came from him, lost Gibson any chance of Belmont's further
support.140
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There appears to be only indirect connections between the Gibson case
and the Ostend Conference which took place at this time. Despite news
reports that the conference did take up the Gibson case,141 there is no
evidence of this in the correspondence of the participants. Considering the
notoriety of Gibson's case, it would be surprising if it did not come up in
the course of conversation, but Belmont's confidence in Gibson was so
weakened after the incident of the correspondence that it is doubtful if any
decision was requested or made at the Ostend Conference. However, it is
significant that Belmont's visit to Paris to receive his invitation to the
conference was the occasion of his meeting Mann and instruction or en-
couragement to threaten the Dutch. Belmont's threatening note to the Dutch
on September 7 is an excellent example of the militia diplomacy which
characterized American relations with several European powers at that time142
and which reached its climax in the Ostend Conference.
The End of the Case
Gibson's claim falters.—Having lost Belmont's confidence, and the ulti-
matum having failed, Gibson started for home in October, 1854. He stopped
off at Liverpool and so beguiled the famous author Nathaniel Hawthorne
with his Sumatra yarns that he lent him thirty English pounds for his pas-
sage home. This sum had not been repaid in 1863.143 Gibson next intended
to "report" to President Pierce and Marcy about the next step in his claim.
However, Marcy remarked, "I know Gibson better than Belmont did and
Gibson knows I know him."144 Marcy probably was referring partly to the
reports from Europe about Gibson's dishonesty and partly to Marcy's general
dislike of filibustering. This was so strong that Marcy actually tendered his
resignation when President Pierce forced him to recognize Walker's filibuster
government of Nicaragua.145 Part of Marcy's knowledge was certainly
Gibson's "base and annoying" treatment of Belmont.146 In addition the
Dutch Minister in Washington had succeeded in increasing Marcy's doubts.
He had even succeeded in persuading Marcy to admit that Gibson's confes-
sion to the Governor-General was "rather awkward" and that Gibson was
"Quite as troublesome to me, as he may be to your Government."147 Gibson
was in for a cool reception from Marcy at any rate, even if the President,
Attorney General Cushing, and Assistant Secretary of State Mann did
support him.148
When Gibson arrived home, suggestions, obviously originating with
Gibson, began to circulate that the United States would bombard or blockade
the, Dutch Indies to enforce his claim. This was immediately denied by
administration sources.149 In Congress, Gibson began to encounter opposi-
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tion. During the debate on the Ostend Conference on December 5, Repre-
sentative Thomas M. Taylor of Ohio criticized Belmont's appointment and
the general practice of writing "'filibustering' letters to foreign nations."150
Gibson took the idea of war to Marcy himself, suggesting that a recom-
mendation to that effect be included in the annual message to Congress.
When Marcy refused, Gibson persuaded Representative Orr to go to Pierce
and Marcy.151 The result was that extracts of the Gibson files were sent
to the House of Representatives on December 16, 1854.152 These were or-
dered printed as the first prerequisite of Congressional action. On December
19 and 20 the Cabinet discussed whether to mention the Gibson claim in
the Presidential Message. Attorney General Cushing opposed it on the
grounds that the United States could not question the operation of the
Dutch judicial system. President Pierce, who favored Gibson, gave in and
the message said nothing about his claim.153
The astuteness of Dutch minister Gevers finally killed the Gibson case.
As soon as the Gibson files were printed by Congress, the Dutch minister
checked through for completeness. Finding Gibson's incriminating con-
fession missing, he sent a note of complaint to Marcy on January 10 and
enclosed a new copy of the confession.154 Marcy invited Gevers to the
State Department on January 11, and called in Mann to ask why the con-
fession had not been sent to Congress, since he had ordered all the papers
to be included. When Mann said the letter was not in the files, Marcy asked
for the dossier. He and Gevers went through it together and could not find
the letter. At that moment President Pierce happened to walk in. When
the story was told to him, Pierce agreed that the letter should be printed.
Gevers obtained permission from Marcy to give a copy to Representative
Baily, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and used the
opportunity to win him to the Dutch side.155 Gevers' whole conduct indicates
a superb piece of diplomacy in presenting pieces of evidence against Gibson
to the proper persons. Of course, the truth of Gibson's mistreatment became
more and more obscured by the progressive discrediting of Gibson.
Marcy sent an official copy of Gibson's confession to the House of Rep-
resentatives on January 19, 1855. In doing so he declared that the Depart-
ment's copy had disappeared while Gibson was examining the files, clearly
implying that Gibson had had it removed because it was too damaging.156
This marked the end of administration support of Gibson. Gevers soon con-
vinced the influential men in Congress to drop Gibson's claim. On February
10 he got Baily's assurance that "you will have no further difficulty" and
Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Mason's good natured congratulations
for his handling of the case.157 As the opposition press dug down into the
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printed documents, they found more and more to Gibson's discredit. By
March 1, 1855, Gibson's claim was almost dead.
Gibson persists.—Gibson did not give up his case easily and was able
to enlist support of his claim in the next congress. He drew up a new defense
of his conduct based on the strong argument about the weakness of Dutch
claims to Djambi. This he had presented to the House by Representative
Abram Wakeman of Connecticut on April 15, 1856.158 His old friend,
Representative Orr, resubmitted the South Carolina resolutions in his favor.159
The House Foreign Relations Committee, to which these were referred,
asked Marcy to obtain a copy of the Djambi Treaty of 1834.160 As a result
of the investigation, the Committee reported on August 2, 1856, in Gibson's
favor. The report presented Gibson's filibustering background, but con-
cluded fairly that he had not violated any Dutch treaty or law by corres-
ponding with the Sultan of Djambi. Finding that Gibson's arrest and con-
fiscation of his property were a "gross violation of his rights," the Committee
asked that the President again apply for indemnification.161 The Dutch
were relieved to be informed that the Department had no intention of taking
up the case again, and that Congress had no time for it in the session of
1856.162
While Congress recessed, Gibson went to Boston. As Boston's interests
in Sumatra were then the greatest of any American city, he was able to get
the Board of Trade to memorialize Congress to send an envoy (himself, of
course) to investigate Dutch claims of sovereignty in the Indies and con-
clude treaties with independent countries there.163 Senator Henry Wilson of
Massachusetts presented a resolution to this effect to the Senate on January
28, 1857. This was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations for
investigation, as was a new memorial of Gibson for indemnity.164 However,
the Committee returned the petition without ever reporting on it.165
Although Gibson's scheme of a treaty with Djambi never came to any
serious conclusion in the United States, the Dutch took it very seriously.
Admitting that the Treaty of 1834 allowed the foreign relations with Djambi
for which Gibson had been convicted, Pahud, now Governor-General, sought
to obtain a new treaty with absolute submission of Djambi to Dutch
sovereignty.166 When the Sultan of Djambi refused to sign the treaty, the
Dutch invaded his domains and forced him to accept.167 To have blamed the
United States for this aggression, as the Dutch did, was ridiculous since the
Dutch files show that they were perfectly well informed that Gibson had
no chance of official support.168 This was not the last time that the United
States was made the scapegoat for Dutch aggression, as we shall see.
The thirty-fifth Congress (1858) was the last one in which Gibson
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succeeded in getting consideration of his claim. He persuaded Represen-
tative Stanton of Ohio to resubmit his petition for indemnity in the House
and Senator Pearce to do the same in the Senate.169 Both of the petitions
died in the foreign affairs committees, ostensibly because no new facts were
presented.170
Gibson then turned to religious groups as a means of getting his kingdom
in Sumatra. As early as 1856 he had contacted the Utah delegate in Congress,
Dr. John M. Bernhisel of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints
(Mormons) to suggest that his church migrate to the Indies.171 This proposal
may have been particularly well received since the Mormons in Utah were
subjected to pressure by the United States in 1858. In the following year
Gibson formally proposed to Brigham Young to make the migration under
his own guidance.172 Making the overland trek to Utah in 1859, Gibson
was baptized a Mormon on January 15, 1860. His scheme of migration was
rejected173 and when his idyllic accounts of the South Seas caused unrest
among a segment of the Mormon people, Brigham Young on April 25, I860,
had Gibson set apart for a mission to the eastern part of the United States
with headquarters in New York. Although Gibson was now a High Priest
he spent less than six months in the east defending Mormonism for he re-
turned to Salt Lake City on November 4, 1860. At a meeting in the Mormon
Tabernacle on November 18, President Young mentioned his "call" to
Gibson to do missionary work in the Pacific and the latter left for "Japan"
on November 21. But for the next seven months Gibson was lecturing on
"Malasia" in San Francisco where he denied that he was a Mormon.174 To
his call to go to the Pacific, Gibson tried to add several non-religious com-
missions. Before he left San Francisco, the Civil War had broken out and
Gibson became a Confederate agent in the Pacific. An attempt to get himself
appointed Commercial Agent for California to report on trade between
"the Malay Islands" and California failed and he left San Francisco for
Singapore in June of 1861.175 Arriving at Honolulu on July 4, Gibson ap-
parently concluded that it was a fruitful field for his ambitions and eventually
he settled down on the island of Lanai. When Gibson's perversion of his
Mission, among other events, resulted in his excommunication from the
Mormon church in 1864, he turned to politics. In fact, in his newspaper,
Nuhou, on April 18, 1873, Gibson said that his "temporary connections"
with the Mormon community had been "for a political object," and while
he did not say in so many words what that object was he finally achieved his
dreams of power under King Kalakaua from 1882 to 1887. That his thoughts
often turned towards Sumatra we have evidence in his plan to make Hawaii
the leader of a confederation of independent powers of the Pacific.176
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Conclusion
Gibson's later career would seem to confirm Dutch suspicions that he
was seeking to duplicate that of Brooke. Dutch documents show, however,
that he had a perfect legal right to treat with Djambi. Had he been a little
more discreet about his intentions, and gone directly to Djambi or to a more
northerly Sultanate of Sumatra, he might have set up an American Sultanate
there. Having failed to do this, Gibson did stimulate more American interest
in Sumatra during the 1850's than there was at any other period in American
history. His attempt also had the important result of obtaining the admis-
sion of Consuls to the East Indies.177 It stimulated American demands by
calling attention to the inadequate protection of American interests there,
and hastened Dutch concession by exerting the uncomfortable pressure of
his claim.
The Gibson affair was probably the most important political event in
the history of American relations with Sumatra. At no time did an American
citizen come closer to obtaining dominion over a portion of Sumatran soil.
Because of his indiscretions, Gibson's chances of success were remote, but
his ambitions there were certainly greater than any American before or
since. Congressional consideration of a Djambi treaty is the closest the
American government came to making active political ties in Sumatra.
However, the lack of widespread support in Congress or in the administra-
tion made its approval improbable, as the Dutch well knew. The United
States government had an active interest in Sumatra because of Gibson's
mistreatment there, but it had no political ambitions there which endangered
the Dutch. The attitude of the United States government throughout this
case was its traditional one of protection of the legitimate interests of its
citizens, and not of territorial aggrandizement.
As far as the impact of the Gibson claim upon Sumatran history, it was
of the greatest importance. The Dutch were so frightened by Gibson's
filibuster and the possibility of its repetition, that it set off a chain of Dutch
preventative conquests. This chain of conquests did not stop until 1908
when all of Sumatra had been reduced to bondage. By stimulating Dutch
paranoia, Gibson certainly did no service to the Sumatrans, but this should
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THE MADRAS AFFAIR*
By ERNEST ANDRADE, jR.f
In the spring of 1883, several developments were coming to a focus to
produce a minor crisis in the Hawaiian kingdom. The first development was
the rule of Walter Murray Gibson, who had been Premier for a year under
the rule of Kalakaua. His activities were already causing serious concern
among the businessmen of the kingdom. Ambitious, scheming and unprin-
cipled, Gibson had managed to win the favor of the king and much of the
native Hawaiian population, and his course as Premier, though only a year
old, was characterized by extravagant schemes which pleased Kalakaua but
depleted the Treasury.1
The second development was the growing realization by the sugar planters
and others that Chinese were no longer suitable for plantation labor.2 By
1883 successful attempts had already been made to encourage immigration
from other parts of the world, notably from Portugal, while negotiations were
underway with Japan which resulted in the entrance into Hawaii of what
was to be its largest racial group. Anti-Chinese feeling was reaching alarming
proportions, perhaps because Chinese continued to enter the Kingdom in
fairly large numbers during this period. Contributing to the dissatisfaction
with the Chinese was the belief that Chinese immigration, if unchecked,
would soon "mongrelize" the native population. Added to this was the belief
that Chinese had been the means by which leprosy and smallpox had entered
the kingdom in recent years. In the former case the charge was probably
untrue, but in the latter it was a fact that a smallpox epidemic in 1881 was
caused by Chinese immigration, and few fears were more dreaded in Hawaii
than the spectre of smallpox. Gibson, Chinese immigration and smallpox—
these were the ingredients of the incident which became known as the Madras
Affair.
On April 10, 1883, the British steamer Madras, carrying 750 Chinese men
from Hong Kong, appeared off the port of Honolulu, preparatory to entering
the harbor. When the harbor pilot came aboard he asked the ship's com-
mander, Captain H. W. Bradley, to submit the customary statement certifying
that there was no infectious disease on board. This was promptly done.3
However, Bradley also gave the pilot two letters similar in content—one to
be delivered to Walter Murray Gibson, President of the Board of Health,
* A Paper given before the Hawaiian Historical Society, March 10, I960.
t Instructor in History, Mid-Pacific Institute, Honolulu.
33
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Premier of the kingdom; and the other to
Dr. Trousseau, the Port Physician. In these letters Bradley said that he had
two cases of smallpox among a group of passengers bound for Victoria,
British Columbia. He requested permission to land his Honolulu passengers
in quarantine and then to reprovision the ship and continue on his way.4
Bradley adopted this seemingly contradictory course of action because, as he
later stated, he did not wish to alarm the Honolulu populace, which had been
subjected to a severe smallpox epidemic brought into the city by immigrating
Chinese only two years before.5
When Gibson read Bradley's letter, he immediately called a meeting of
the Board of Health. A difficult problem presented itself. In a normal
situation the Hawaiian quarantine laws required all passengers for Honolulu
arriving in an infected vessel to be landed at the quarantine station near the
entrance to the harbor, where they would be fed, housed and cared for
through an appropriate waiting period, the costs to be paid by the ship's
owners. In the case of the Madras however, it was impossible to provide for
the passengers as the law provided, because the quarantine station was al-
ready full. On March 29, another British ship had landed a boatload of
Chinese, who were still at the station to await the termination of that quaran-
tine period. A second British vessel had arrived two days earlier and was
waiting off port to discharge its passengers, while yet another British ship
was expected within four days.6 After hasty discussion the Board of Health
passed a resolution which was dispatched to Captain Bradley. The resolution
noted that the Madras had arrived off port with smallpox on board, then
authorized the President of the Board of Health to take steps to avoid the
risk of contagion "and consequently to prevent the landing of any passengers
from the "Madras! "7 When this resolution was published in the government
newspaper, the Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, public opinion in Hono-
lulu was aroused, for the people remembered vividly the disastrous plague
of 1881. It was perhaps the first time since Gibson became Premier that most
of the white business and professional community supported him, for they
generally had opposed his policies and looked upon him as a clever but un-
principled scoundrel who had played upon King Kalakaua's vanity and prej-
udices to gain his position as head of the government. But in the case of
the Madras there was nearly unanimous approval of Gibson's action, at least
for a short time. The Hawaiian Gazette, the journalistic mouthpiece of the
business group which usually opposed Gibson, commented:
"The Board are alive to the situation and are evidently trying their best
to meet the evil. Under such circumstances party differences should be
laid aside on this point, and the Board should be sustained by all shades
34
of opinion in doing what is necessary for the health and safety of our
population."*
Unanimity did not continue for long. Within a day or two it became
apparent that the government's action had been hasty and perhaps ill-judged.
Captain Bradley was astonished at the government's refusal to allow him to
land any passengers. In spite of the fact that the quarantine station was full,
the laws implicitly required the Hawaiian government to make some kind
of provision for arriving passengers. This was not done, and the Madras was
simply not allowed to land passengers at all. Gibson felt that Bradley should
have sailed on to Victoria, carrying his Honolulu passengers with him and
landing them in Honolulu on his return trip. On April 19, Gibson wrote a
letter to Thomas Howard, the agent for the Madras in Hong Kong, in which
he stated that he had suggested to Bradley that he "go forward to Victoria
(a course I still believe to be the wisest and least costly) . . ."9 Bradley did
not believe that he could do this and still keep the number of smallpox cases
from multiplying and perhaps even infecting his own crew. On April 11,
shortly after being notified of the Board's prohibition, he wrote to Gibson,
claiming he did not submit a false report and was sure the Board could not
refuse him entry. He stated:
"I beg of you not to overlook the fact of my position at sea, if this
disease should break out in a virulent form. At present, my officers
and self have no fear of the contagion, but how long this may last the
Almighty knows.
"We have no fresh cases yet, and the two old ones are progressing
favorably, and what I would beg of you to do, is to take all the healthy
people that are for Honolulu on shore and allow me to depart from
your port."10
To this letter Bradley received no reply. Feeling that the situation was
beyond him, he called on Theo. H. Davies and Company, authorizing the
firm to act as his agents and giving to it the task of further negotiations with
the Board of Health. On April 13, Davies wrote Gibson, asking him if the
Madras was to be considered in quarantine, and proposed a plan for landing
the Honolulu passengers on the reef at the harbor entrance. Gibson replied
next day, saying that he had "to reaffirm assurances that the Board cannot
consent to the landing of the passengers on board Madras affected by small-
pox under any circumstances." In reply to this letter, Davies asked on April
14, that the Madras be allowed to commence quarantine, and threatened to
apply to the courts for an order to compel action by the Board. To this letter
Davies received no immediate reply, and becoming more perturbed at the
35
hostility toward the Madras in the community, he submitted the correspond-
ence in the case up to that point to the Hawaiian Gazette for publication.11
Sensing that the Board of Health had made some sort of blunder, the
Gazette shifted ground. Its former position had been based on the belief that
the Madras was not intending to call at Honolulu but was now there simply
to dump some unwanted passengers, regardless of what Honolulu may have
thought about it. Upon receiving assurances from both Bradley and Davies
that more than half the passengers actually had Honolulu as their destina-
tion,12 the Gazette came to the support of the Madras and resumed its more
accustomed role of denouncing Gibson, while presumably the business leaders
also took up the cry. At this point the Madras affair became a political issue.
Gibson, who seemed to have been trying to find a way out of the dilemma,
became less inclined than ever to be conciliatory. However, increased op-
position did prod him into resuming correspondence with Davies. Gibson
attempted to clarify his position in letters to Davies on April 19 and 24, in
which he said that since the Madras was flying the yellow flag it could be
considered in quarantine. However, since the quarantine was intended only
for recruits and not for passengers, such a clarification served only to confuse
matters, and by April 25 it was clear that an impasse had been reached.
Meanwhile, the Madras continued to languish at anchor outside the harbor
while the disease ran its course on board. To the two original smallpox
cases there had been added one other, who died within a few days. Another
passenger had thrown himself overboard and drowned.13 Bradley and his
crew had always to be on guard against an attempt to seize the ship or to
escape to shore in the ship's boats.14 No doubt the situation aboard the Madras
was exaggerated in rumors among the Honolulu community, but it must
have been a trying time for Bradley, his crew and the passengers. Gibson
authorized the stationing of guards on shore and in small boats to prevent
any Chinese from sneaking ashore, but beyond this he would not go, and
for two more weeks things remained as they were.
On May 5, a couple of port physicians were sent to board the Madras
and examine the passengers. They were able to find that only three cases of
smallpox had occurred up to that time, one of whom had died and had been
buried at sea, while the other two had recovered. They further stated that
since they had found no sickness aboard and the vessel was "in as good a
state of cleanliness as can be expected," they recommended that the Madras
be allowed to enter port upon which quarantine activities could begin.15 On
May 7, the Board notified Bradley that he might bring his ship into the
harbor and send his passengers to the quarantine station, provided that he
met certain conditions, the most important of which being that he pay ex-
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penses of quarantine surveillance and post a bond of $20.00 per passenger
landed as required by law.16 Bradley agreed to these terms and brought his
ship into the harbor the next morning.
Perhaps the affair would have ended at this point, but two new develop-
ments complicated the proceedings. With the Madras in the harbor, Bradley
was notified that he must pay the bond before entering the harbor.17 Being
unprepared to do these things immediately, Bradley turned about and moved
back to his former anchorage, whereupon a number of the passengers jumped
overboard and tried to swim ashore but were picked up by the guard boats
and returned to the ship.
The second development was more alarming. It will be recalled that
when the passengers of the Madras were examined, no active smallpox was
found among them. The reason for this unusual circumstance was discovered
when the crew made ready to take the ship into port on the morning of
May 8. In the course of their duties they found nine new smallpox patients
who were hidden by their fellow passengers in out-of-the-way places so that
the doctors' inspection could be successfully passed. Davies reported this new
development to Gibson the next day,18 and on May 12, the Board laid down
new conditions to be met before beginning quarantine. These were generally
the same as the previous conditions, except that the required bond was raised
to a flat sum of $20,000. In spite of the new demands, Davies and Bradley
were willing to abide by them and required the Board to draw up the of-
ficial bond agreement. On May 14, the agreement was submitted to Davies,
who discovered in it some new conditions not previously agreed to, where-
upon he advised Bradley to refuse to sign it. With this action negotiations
reached a dead end. When Davies made further inquiries, Gibson informed
him that the Board of Health no longer recognized the firm of Theo. H.
Davies as the agents of the Madras.19
Up to this time the British government had not intervened in the case,
although it seems probable that John H. Wodehouse, the British consul
general in the islands, knew of the general state of affairs. At any rate, when
Davies was refused further recognition by the Board he took his case to
Wodehouse and asked him to make inquiries as the representative of the
British government. At this point the affair became a diplomatic incident.
On May 23, Wodehouse wrote to Gibson, asking why the Board of Health
had refused to recognize Davies as the Madras' agent. This direct action
brought immediate results. Gibson replied courteously to Wodehouse's in-
quiry, and said that after the consul general's assurances as to Davies' right
to act for the Madras, "I shall be prepared to give the most careful and
courteous attention to any communications they may desire to make to me
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or to the Board of Health."20 Soon afterward agreement was reached on
conditions to be met by Bradley prior to landing his passengers. On June 2,
bond was fixed at $10,000 and government expenses which Gibson claimed
up to that time were set at libel. On the evening of June 6, the port physician
went on board the Madras and examined all the passengers. The next day,
after fifty-eight days offshore, the Madras entered the harbor and landed its
Honolulu passengers at the quarantine station. There were nine active cases
of smallpox among them; in addition there had been ten cases who had
recovered and one who had died.21
With the landing of the passengers the Madras case may have appeared
to the casual observer to have been closed. There were many, however, who
felt that the entry of the British government into the affair spelled future
trouble, and their fears were well founded. Strangely enough, it seems that
Wodehouse did not contact his government about the Madras affair.22 Never-
theless, the British Foreign Office learned of the case when the owner of the
Madras wrote an indignant letter to the Foreign Secretary on August 23,
1883, setting forth the general state of affairs, condemning the action of the
Hawaiian government and asking for redress. In closing he stated, "I trust
your Lordship will consider the case sufficiently important to have it specially
inquired into."23
The wheels of the government machinery commenced to turn, although
slowly. On November 29, the Foreign Office referred the complaint to the
Board of Trade for an opinion, and after due deliberation the Board replied
that the owner had a good case. "It appears to the Board of Trade that this
vessel has been subjected by the Hawaiian authorities to arbitrary and in-
hospitable treatment contrary to the letter and spirit of the Rule no. 2."24
The Board of Trade further stated that this claim could be supported by the
British government. Meanwhile the Foreign Office had contacted Wodehouse
in Honolulu and obtained more information from him.25 Following the
recommendation of the Board of Trade, the Foreign Office advised Wode-
house on December 21, that the British government would support fully the
owners of the Madras. Upon receipt of this communication the case became
a live issue once more. On January 23, 1884, Wodehouse presented the
views of his government to Gibson in no uncertain terms:
"I am instructed by His Lordship, to represent to the Government of
His Hawaiian Majesty that the treatment to which this vessel has been
subjected appears to Her Majesty's government to have been arbitrary
and inhospitable,...
"I am to add, that any reasonable claim on behalf of the owner of the
'Madras' for compensation for the unnecessary expense to which he
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was put through the action of the Hawaiian Board of Health, will
meet with the support of Her Majesty's Government."2^
The blow could not have been unexpected, for developments had pointed
toward such a verdict as soon as the British government became involved in
the affair. Gibson, however, continued to support his action, at least pub-
licly. He informed Wodehouse that the British government could have
reached such a conclusion only because it was not aware of all the facts, and
that a final disposition of the case should be postponed pending the outcome
of the Hawaiian government's court case against the owner of the Madras.27
The court case had come about when Gibson claimed damages of
$1,742.25, this being the cost of maintaining shore and boat guards around
the Madras from the time it was known the ship had smallpox on board.
The basis of Gibson's claim was that the Madras had actually been in
quarantine since April 10; while the agents of the Madras contended that
there had been no application of the quarantine laws to the vessel until
June 7, when the passengers were landed, hence there had been no quarantine.
Chief Justice Judd heard the arguments in the case, and on February 26,
1884, he announced his decision, basing most of it on the correspondence
relative to the case, plus ^testimony. His conclusion was that in order for a
ship to be in quarantine under the laws of the kingdom certain acts must
be performed both by the ship concerned and by the Board of Health. As
far as he could see, the Board had not done what it was supposed to do and
had consistently refused to inform the Madras of its duties, in spite of re-
peated requests. Judd noted Gibson's statement to Davies that the ship was
in quarantine "for recruits but not for passengers," which seemed to mean
exactly what it said. The decision concluded, "As appears by the letter above
quoted, the steamer was prohibited from landing passengers purely and
simply. Prohibition is not quarantine."28
The Hawaiian government appealed the verdict to the full court, but
Judd's decision was sustained. Fortified by the verdict in their favor, the
owners of the Madras prepared a claim for damages against the Hawaiian
Government, which was presented by Davies to Gibson on March 5. The
claim, covering cost of subsistence, coal, water, general damages and interest,
amounted to $31,201.55.29 Gibson continued to defend his action and re-
garded the claim as unjustified. He said that the only place where the claim
could be settled was in the Hawaiian courts. Davies replied that the Supreme
Court decision left no doubt as to the justice of the claim. The question of
responsibility was settled, and the Hawaiian government should compensate
the owners without delay. Receiving no satisfactory reply to his request,
Davies took his case back to Wodehouse.30 He explained that if a suit in
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court should succeed, it would be a needless expense; but should the decision
go against the Madras, the owner would lose his right of appeal to the
British government since, "we would be appealing to them to interfere with
the decision of a Court which we ourselves had invoked."31
On March 15, Wodehouse asked Gibson if his latest letter to Davies
represented the official position of the Hawaiian government. Gibson replied
that it did. "The question of the liability of the Board of Health to the
owners of the Madras is purely a legal one, and has not been touched by the
decision given in favor of that vessel in the recent libel action."32 Wode-
house reiterated Davies' claim that the case had already been settled and
responsibility fixed. Both he and Davies saw Gibson's attitude as a stubborn
refusal to admit defeat, but there was little they could do. If the Hawaiian
government refused to pay the Madras claim, there was nothing to be done
but take the case to the courts, which was exactly what Gibson wanted done.
The reason for his insistence on such a procedure is not documented, but it
seems likely that he intended to delay matters as long as he could with the
hope that the costs of litigation would discourage the plaintiffs from con-
tinuing to press their claim. It is also possible that Gibson was optimistic
about the outcome of a court case, should it take place. Many of the witnesses
were scattered over the world, and it would be difficult to bring them together
for the case in Honolulu. On the other hand, Gibson was not fighting simply
the owners of the Madras. Arrayed against him was a large segment of the
local business community, among whom the Madras had become a cause
celebre, and in the background lay the threatening shadow of the British gov-
ernment, whose attitude toward the case since the court libel case was as yet
unknown.
Wodehouse made one more effort to secure direct action by his govern-
ment without the necessity of a court case. Mindful of the quick response
which the previous direct intervention of the British government had brought,
he presented the situation, as far as it had developed, to London once more.33
Once again the Foreign Office asked the Board of Trade for an opinion, and
on May 23, 1884, the Board replied that after examining the case it appeared
to be as strong as ever. The Board stated that:
"in principle, the claim deserves support by Her Majesty's Govern-
ment. Whether such support can be best afforded by countenancing
the agents in bringing their case before the Courts of Hawaii or by
independent diplomatic action seems to be a point for the consider-
ation of His Lordship."^
The Foreign Office then sent instructions to Wodehouse which indicated
that the official British position was that a court action should not be under-
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taken except as a last resort, and that the consul general should endeavor
"to obtain some compensation for the owners of the 'Madras' from the
Hawaiian government, or a reference of the matter to arbitration."35 How-
ever, if no success was gained in the matter the British government would
take no further action and a court case should be undertaken. Such a quali-
fied stand did not meet with Wodehouse's approval, and he wrote a strong
letter to London on July 15, reiterating his earlier position as to the unlikeli-
hood of a successful court action. He claimed that Edward Preston, the
counsel for the Madras—who incidentally as Attorney General in 1883 had
presented the Hawaiian Government's case in the libel action—stated that
the difficulty of producing the witnesses made it almost impossible to press
the Madras claim successfully.36
Upon receipt of this letter, the Foreign Office decided to consult the Law
Officers of the Crown, whose position as a legal oracle was evidently higher
than that of the Board of Trade. On August 25, the Law Officers were given
the case, and after some study they replied that it appeared that the owners
of the Madras were without remedy in the Hawaiian courts. They went on
to say: "Under these circumstances, we think that your Lordship may well
consider the propriety of making strong diplomatic representations to the
Hawaiian Government in support of the claim of the owners of the ves-
sel,.. ,"37
Armed with this legal opinion, the Foreign Office then contacted Wode-
house, and assured him of the full support of the British government.
"It appears that the owners of the 'Madras' are advised that they have
a good cause of action against the Hawaiian Government, but that
they cannot prosecute it with any chance of success owing to the
absence of the material witnesses. . . . Her Majesty's Government are
therefore justified in holding, that the owners are in fact without
remedy in the Hawaiian Courts. . . .
"The 'Madras' committed no infraction of international or municipal
law and Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand on
what grounds the Hawaiian Government refused to admit her to
quarantine, and they can but consider such refusal a most unfriendly
act."*8
Wodehouse communicated the contents of this note to Gibson on Decem-
ber 6, and when its contents became known to the Honolulu public Gibson's
opponents set up a loud outcry. The certainty that the British Government
would take a strong stand in the matter served to inspire the anti-Gibson
group to further denunciation of his policies. The Gazette stated that in
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diplomatic parlance the phrase "a most unfriendly act" was strong language
indeed. It could not understand why the government continued to defend
an indefensible position. "That the owners of the Madras will be indemnified
there can be no doubt, and all the vaporing in the world will not alter the
case."39
The stiffening of the British attitude was so ominous that Gibson was
prompted to write an extremely long and detailed explanation of the entire
affair from the point of view of the Hawaiian government, together with
numerous enclosures in the form of letters and affidavits, which he sent to
Wodehouse to be forwarded to London. In his letter of explanation he
presented his strongest defense, stating that it "appears to His Hawaiian
Majesty's Government that on all the points just recited, Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment has been misinformed."40 Gibson contended that the epidemic
which had occurred in 1881 had been due to misrepresentation by ships'
captains. "Had His Majesty's Government at that [time] taken the step
which in this case has been called an inhospitable action, the country would
have been saved from a dreadful calamity." He took special note of the
overcrowded condition of the quarantine station at the time the Madras first
appeared off port.41
Gibson's defense apparently made a difference, for when the Law Officers
of the Crown received it from the Foreign Office,42 they took special notice
of the 1881 epidemic and the unruly state of the passengers aboard the
Madras as at least a partial justification for the action of the Board of
Health. As the Law Officers stated it, these considerations "formed ground
for extreme vigilance of action on the part of the Hawaiian Government."43
This was not to say that the treatment of the Madras was acceptable; on the
contrary, the vessel had been subjected to unwarranted persecution. The
point was that these extenuating circumstances, plus the fact that the libel
case had been decided in favor of the Madras, meant that the British gov-
ernment should no longer press for satisfaction outside the courts. Acting
upon this advice, the Foreign Office notified Wodehouse of this new attitude
with the recommendation that the Madras case be prosecuted in the courts
of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
All that now remained was to take legal action, but this was not a simple
matter. The plaintiffs had to collect their witnesses and bring them to
Hawaii, and it was not until the passage of another year that they considered
their case complete. They then petitioned the Hawaiian government to
allow suit to be brought against itself in the courts, and on March 9, 1886,
the Privy Council granted their petition.44
In April 1887, the final episode in the drama of the Madras drew to a
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close when the case was at last taken up by the courts. On April 21, Justice
McCully and twelve jurors sat in judgment. The verdict was a foregone
conclusion, in view of the previous Supreme Court decision in the case; for
in spite of Gibson's contention that the libel case of February, 1884, had
no bearing on the damage suit, it proved actually to be the key factor. With
the previous decision before it, the court took little time to decide that
damages could be collected because of the action of the Hawaiian govern-
ment. The only problem was in determining the exact amount to be paid.
It was finally decided that the original claim by the owners of the Madras,
with but a few deductions, should apply. The sum to be paid was fixed at
$22,943.25, while the interest allowed on the claim brought the total to
slightly more than $30,000.45
Thus ended the Madras affair. In itself a relatively minor dispute in its
early stages, it received great attention locally because of the political impli-
cations of the case. The key point in the whole affair was the refusal of the
Hawaiian government to place the Madras in quarantine as the law required.
It was obvious that the crowding of the quarantine station did not permit
the carrying out of the letter of the law, but this did not absolve the gov-
ernment from its responsibility to make accommodation in some way, and
in fact at least one alternate and workable solution was offered. It is likely
that the criticism to which Gibson was subjected by his political enemies
played some part in solidifying his stand against all odds—an attitude which,
while not perfectly logical, was at least understandable. Although Gibson
was able to bring about a lessening of pressure by the British government,
in the end he lost the fight. It is difficult to see how he could have seriously
considered the possibility of a court victory, especially in view of the deci-
sion in the libel case, but he seems to have done so.
On the basis of the evidence, responsibility in the affair was undoubtedly
Gibson's, both from the standpoint of the original mistake—which could
have been rectified quickly if admitted promptly—and from the standpoint
of Gibson's refusal to admit any error in his actions. If he had not disclaimed
responsibility, it is unlikely that the case would ever have gone much beyond
the Board of Health and the ship's agents and assumed such proportions
that it became, for Hawaii at least, a major diplomatic incident and a costly
one.
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MINUTES OF THE 68TH ANNUAL MEETING
March 10, I960
The annual meeting of the Hawaiian Historical Society was held in the
Mission-Historical Library on Thursday evening, March 10, I960, at 8
o'clock. President William R. Norwood presided. The reading of the minutes
of the last annual meeting was waived as they had been printed in the last
annual report. The Treasurer, Dr. Jacob Adler, gave a summary of his report
and stated that the full report would be printed. It was moved and seconded
to accept the report. Motion was carried. The Librarian, Mrs. W. C. Handy,
read her report. It was moved and seconded that the report be received
and filed.
The following resolution, introduced by Miss Agnes Conrad, was unan-
imously adopted by the Society:
"WHEREAS, the State of Hawaii has few historic buildings
remaining as visual symbols of the culture and history of old Hawaii,
and
"WHEREAS, Iolani Palace, built by King Kalakaua in 1882 as
the official residence for the monarchs of the Hawaiian Kingdom,
and Iolani Barracks, built by King Kamehameha V in 1870 for the
Royal Household Guards, were closely associated with Hawaiian
history during the last years of the monarchy, and
"WHEREAS, both should be preserved as near as possible in their
original form for the enjoyment and education of both residents and
visitors,
"BE IT RESOLVED by the Hawaiian Historical Society that the
Governor of the State of Hawaii be and is hereby requested to des-
ignate by public proclamation Iolani Palace and the surrounding
grounds and Iolani Barracks as State Historical Monuments to assure
their preservation as historic sites."
Mr. George Bacon, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, recom-
mended the following persons for election:
President (for 1 year)—Harold W. Kent.
Trustees (for 2 years)—Miss Bernice Judd, Miss Marion Morse, Miss
Agnes Conrad, and Mrs. Richard L. Summers.
Holdover Trustees are Charles H. Hunter, Meiric K. Dutton, Donald D.
Mitchell, and Janet E. Bell.
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The report was adopted and the Secretary instructed to cast the ballot,
which unanimously elected the officers nominated by the Committee.
Mr. Norwood, President, introduced the speaker of the evening, Mr.
Ernest Andrade, who spoke on "The Madras Case."




M E E T I N G O F T H E N O V E M B E R 1 9 , 1 9 5 9
The Hawaiian Historical Society held an open meeting on Thursday
evening, November 19, 1959, at the Mission-Historical Library.
Dr. Norman Meller, Professor of Government at the University of
Hawaii, was the speaker of the evening, giving an interesting talk on "A
Political Scientist Looks at Hawaiian History."
Refreshments were served at the social hour under the direction of Miss
Conrad and Miss Bell.
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R E P O R T O F T H E P R E S I D E N T
To THE MEMBERS OF
THE HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY:
Achievement of statehood assures for 1959 its place of distinction in
Hawaiian history. This event has had and will continue to have impact upon
the Hawaiian Historical Society in various ways.
First, as will be noted in the report of our librarian, Mrs. Willowdean
Handy, there has been a substantial increase in the number of requests
received for information from our files and supply of printed data. This
is a reflection of the widespread interest which statehood has stimulated
among writers, publications, libraries and various organizations throughout
the nation.
Secondly, with every indication that this revitalized interest in Hawaii
will continue for some time, our Society's library and librarian may expect
to receive a significantly larger number of inquiries than in previous years.
As a result of this broadened interest in Hawaii and Hawaiiana, it is perhaps
timely to remind our members—and through them hope that others will be
reminded—that our Society solicits and welcomes the opportunity to become
a depository of historical data. We perhaps need to remind our friends
throughout the community that our interests are not limited to the missionary
era or monarchial period, but that the collection of material recording the
developing history of Hawaii is a continuing process.
Coincident with achievement of statehood, and partially as a result of it,
we are experiencing profound physical changes in the character of our island
community. The past year has seen some historical sites come under the
pressure of resort development and proposals for providing our new state
government with more modern facilities. Here, perhaps, is another challenge
for our Society to remain alert for the opportunity to preserve—or join with
other interested organizations in helping to preserve—historical sites and
structures which may be saved from demolition or obliteration without
seriously impeding community progress.
Thus we find the year past has provided the Society with new and ex-
panded opportunities for service. To continue to be effective and to be able
to meet this new opportunity successfully will require enlarged membership
support and participation. As will be noted in the treasurer's report the
Society's income from memberships and other current sources was just short
of covering our operating expenses for the year. A major achievement in
connection with our finances was the establishment during the year of an
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arrangement for a thorough reorganization of our accounting and book-
keeping procedures. This was achieved through the cooperation of Mrs.
Vivien K. Gilbert, C.P.A., who agreed to handle our books for us for a
modest retainer.
At the calendar year's end the Society's roster showed 258 paid up
members, including 18 who were admitted to membership during the year.
With the recent revival of interest in Hawaiian history, attributable in part
to statehood, there probably are many individuals in the community who
are membership prospects. Unfortunately the impression is fairly prevalent
throughout the community that our Society admits only scholars of academic
accomplishment or those who can qualify as "historians." Our present mem-
bers should help us spread the word that all we require is a genuine interest
in Hawaii and its history and the modest membership fee.
Our library was fortunate in the acquisition of a number of valuable
additions during the year. We are particularly grateful for the grant of $500
by the S. N. and Mary Castle Foundation for the purchase of books. Ac-
quisitions of particular note and other events in an active year will be
covered in the report of our librarian, Mrs. Handy, to whom I am especially
grateful for her devoted service to the Society and understanding help
throughout the year to me. I wish also to thank the Trustees and members
of the various committees for their generous cooperation.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM R. NORWOOD, President
Hawaiian Historical Society
REPORT OF THE AUDITOR
To THE OFFICERS AND TRUSTEES OF
THE HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY:
In accordance with your request, I have examined the documentary
evidence of transactions in 1959 for the Hawaiian Historical Society, and
the assets and liabilities as of the calender year-end. The Statement of
Financial Condition at December 31, 1959, and the Statement of Income
and Expense for the year then ended, which were prepared by me from
such data, and from the books of account, are submitted herewith.
Yours very truly,










Bishop Nat'l Bank checking account $ 194.55
Bishop Nat'l Bank savings account 1,443.81
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n 2,343-77 $ 3,982.13
Investments at market, 12/31/59 4,782.50
Books and pamphlets for resale 7,458.53
Total current assets $16,223.16
Capital Assets:
Library of books and pamphlets at cost, including
purchases with Special Funds $ 8,261.24
Pictures, photographs and maps 1,995.00
Furniture and equipment, less depreciation 637.61




Payroll taxes payable, 4th Quarter 1959 $ 15-00
Restricted Reserves:
12/31/58 Incr. Deer. 12/31/59
Microfilming Fund $1,247.04 _ _ $ 1,247.04
M. Jones Fund 216.82 . $ 70.59 146.23
S. N. and M. Castle Fund- 138.05 $500.00 150.75 487.30
$1,601.91 500.00 221.34 1,880.57
Capital:
Balance at 12/31/58 $32,400.92
Adjustments, post-closing (244.41)
Increase in 1959 from utilization of
Special Funds, incl. M. Dutton 231.64
Increase in 1959 to greater market value of
investments at 12/31/59 222.50
$32,610.65
Net Income for 1959 (Exhibit B) (589-21) 32,021.44
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL " ~ $33,917.01
EXHIBIT B
HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY
STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSE FOR
THE 12 MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1959
INCOME:
Membership dues:
153 regular members $ 765.00 $
32 contributing members 320.00
3 sustaining members 75.00
4 life members 400.00
16 prior year's dues 90.00 1,650.00
Contributions:
Annie H. Parke Estate $ 338.41
Dole Royalty 124.50
Na Himeni Hawaii 10.66
Other 5.00 478.57
Dividends and interest 360.08
Sales: Books and Publications less estimated
cost of sales 107.56
Total income $2,596.21
EXPENSE:
Printing annual report $ 409.87
less allocation to Inventory of 206 @ .82 each (168.92)
240.95
Librarian's salary and payroll tax expense 1,230.00
Building maintenance 360.00
Accounting and auditing 300.00
Telephone expense 146.52
Library and office supplies and expense 134.55
Miscellaneous other charges, including annual
depreciation on building, furniture and equipment 773.40
Total expense 3,185.42
Net income (to Exhibit A) $ (589.21)
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REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN
For various reasons acquisitions were slowed down during 1959, but with
the receipt of a $500 donation from the S. N. and Mary Castle Foundation
for the purchase of books, this program of expanding our collections has
been resumed and there will be more to report for I960.
However, we did purchase a few interesting items with the residue of
a former gift of the Castle Foundation. These were the most noteworthy:
"Social Service in Hawaii," by Mary Margaret Catton, from the librarian's
point of view is a god-send, for it outlines the history of numerous health
and welfare organizations of Hawaii which have no other definite sources
of reference. "Anthropology in the South Seas," compiled by J. D. Freeman
and W. R. Geddes is a commemorative volume in honor of Dr. H. D. Skinner
of New Zealand, to which eleven well-known anthropoligists have contributed
articles. Mathurin Dondo's "La Perouse in Maui," privately printed by the
Maui Publishing Company, is a handy pamphlet covering that portion of
the voyage of the lost navigator which especially interests us in Hawaii.
Since I reported to you at the last annual meeting, we have added only
two volumes to those purchased by the Maude Jones Memorial Fund. The
first is a unique record of a voyage round the world in the ship "Hampton,"
which left Boston in 1849 with a cargo of lumber for San Francisco as its
first destination. It is "Reminiscences of a Voyage around the World" by
R. C. Davis, who was only thirteen years old when he accompanied his
father, the Captain. His description of his twenty days in Honolulu is re-
freshing and his account of the ten Hawaiians who shipped on the vessel
from our port is revealing.
The second is a beautiful edition by the Antiquarian Press of New York
of the "Journal of David Douglas, during his travels in North America,
1823-1827." The second Appendix covers his sojourn in the Sandwich
Islands through extracts from his journal of 1833-1834; the third Appendix
contains correspondence regarding his death in the bull pit on Hawaii; and
the fourth quotes a notice from a San Francisco newspaper regarding the
monument erected for him.
Several institutions have donated books to our library, the Bishop
Museum and the University of Hawaii presses sending us their publications
as usual, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, through Miss Hoskins,
the librarian, turning over to us twenty-one volumes which were duplicates
or outside their field of interest.
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Individuals also have been generous. Mr. Robert Clopton gave us a
splendid pictorial volume, "Historic Hawaiian Homes" by Edna Williamson
Stall. Through Miss Janet Bell, we received English and Swedish copies of
O. A. Bushnell's "The Last Days of Captain Cook." Mr. Meiric Dutton not
only sent us his Christmas brochure, "The Case of the Elusive Hubs and
Dies," but purchased for us a volume of the Transactions of the London
Missionary Society for 1825 and 1826. Mr. Curtis Cluff is giving us copies
of "Hawaii Industry" and "Builders Report" as they are issued. Mrs. Simes
Hoyt, another perennial donor, has added to our collection of clippings,
pictures and magazines. Col. Harold W. Kent gave us his "Charles Reed
Bishop of Hawaii." Robert Van Dyke brought us from Europe three auto-
graphed books from royal personages. First, "The King's Story, the Memoirs
of H. R. H. the Duke of Windsor," an autobiography, which is especially
valuable because it is made out to the Hawaiian Historical Society and signed
"Edward" on his personal bookplate. The other books are: "Helen, Queen
Mother of Rumania, Princess of Greece and Denmark," and "Crown Prince
against the Sickle, The Story of King Michael of Rumania," both author-
ized biographies by Arthur Gould Lee, both autographed by their subjects.
Occasionally we receive objects which embody history. Now we have
been presented with a souvenir spoon designed to celebrate Statehood. This
came from Mrs. Ivan Rainwater, who helped with the composition of the
pattern. Loan material of value was brought in by Mr. Van Dyke, first hand
data on the Revolution of 1893, and N. B. Emerson's collection of affidavits
on the Rebellion of 1895.
Research undertaken by the Librarian for inquirers is of interest when
analysed. We wondered whether the achievement of Statehood would affect
these requests. It would seem to be so. In 1958 there were 17 requests for
information from 10 states. In 1959 there were 67, four times as many,
from 15 states. In addition there were queries from 15 schools in 1959 as
compared to three the previous year.
Some of these inquiries were definitely inspired by Statehood itself, since
they were concerned with the various insignia of Hawaii; and some called
for Hawaiian data to be included in books covering all the states, such as
Railroads, Covered Bridges, German-American Newspapers in the various
states.
On the other hand requests for information revealed the usual types of
interest, genealogies and biographies, Hawaiian money (how I wish we
could reprint our 48th Annual Report containing Mr. Billiam-Walker's
article on that!). New fields of research were also opened: Austrians in
Hawaii, the first basketball played here, early circuses, and finally Hawaiian
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buttons which lead us into a dozen or more civilian and military organizations.
Again my sincere thanks go to my volunteer helpers, Mrs. Agnes
Bickerton who keeps the clipping files in order, and Mrs. Helen Lind who
assists me in work for the Treasurer.
Respectfully submitted,
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Towill, Mrs. Roswell M.
Von Holt, Mrs. Herman
Waterhouse, John T.
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Castle, Harold K. L.
Collins, George M.
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Bacon, Mrs. George E.
Bailey, Mrs. Alice Cooper
Barrere, Mrs. F. Waldron
Barrett, Gwynn W.








Bryan, Edwin H., Jr.
Bushnell, Oswald
Carlsmith, Wendell
Carney, Mrs. J. J.
Carter, A. Hartwell
Carter, Mrs. Reginald H.
Cartwright, William Edward
Chaffee, Mrs. W. N.
Chariot, Jean










Williams, Mrs. Edith B.
REGULAR
Cloward, Dr. R. B.
Cogswell, W. O.
Cooke, Mrs. Harrison R.
Corbett, Mrs. Gerald R.
Cox, Mrs. Isaac M.
Crellin, Curtis V.
Davis, Carl D.
Davis, Mrs. Carl D.
Day, Josephine
Dunkhase, Mrs. Carl













Frazier, Mrs. Harold V.
Gibson, Ynez
Goss, Mrs. George E.
Griffing, Robert P., Jr.





Handy, Mrs. Willowdean C.
Hansen, Dagny B.
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Ass'n
Herman, F. B.
Hinkley, Mrs. Vern
Historical Society, Island of Hawaii
Holden, Margaret E.
Halloway, Mrs. Ethel S.
Hoskins, Charlotta M.
Humme, Charles W.
Henry E. Hutington Library
Iolani School Library
Jabulka, Mrs. Jan
Jackson, Mrs. Ellen S.
Jackson, Frances




Johnson, Mrs. Rockne H.












King, Davis M. K.
King, Pauline
King, Samuel P.
Krauss, Noel L. H.
Kreiger, Robert
Kuck, Loraine E.
Larsen, Dr. Nils P.
Larsen, Mrs. Nils P.
Lee, Shao Chang
Leebrick, K. C.
Lincoln, Mrs. William Ames
Lind, Mrs. Helen Y.
Loomis, Albertine





McNeilly, Mrs. Mildred M.
Mann, John Cline
Marcus, A. G.













Norwood, Mrs. William R.
Oliphant, C. T.
Peterson, Margaret L.
Plews, Mrs. Edith J. K. Rice
Podmore, Mrs. Geoffrey
Poole, Mrs. Alice F.
Poole, Mrs. Charles F.
Potter, Norris W.
Prendergast, Eleanor K.
Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.






San Francisco Public Library
Schaefer, Mrs. Gustav E.
Scott, E. B.
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Shower, Hazen Titcomb, Margaret
Sinclair, Miriam Tracy, Clifton H.
Smith, Emerson C. Twigg-Smith, Thurston
Smith, Gordon
Smith, Margaret University of Hawaii Press
Smith, Raymond P.
Soehren, Lloyd J. Van Dyke, Robert E.
Sousa, Esther F.
Sparks, Robert W. Walker, Dr. Hastings H.
Spoehr, Alexander Warinner, Emily V.
Sterling, Elspeth P. Watanabe, Shichiro
Stokes, John F. G. Waterhouse, N. Warren
Struve, Mrs. Karl H. Watson, Lorinda E.
Sultan, Mrs. Edward D. Watson, Mrs. Lorna K. Iaukea
Summers, Mrs. Richard L. Wheeler, Richard H.
Swenson, Mrs. Eric P. Wiig, Jon
Williams, Robert T.,Sr.
Taylor, Mrs. Clarice B. Wilson, Robert F.
Taylor, Stanley S. Wilson, Willard
Terry, Seymour Winne, Jane L
Thurston, Lorrin P. Wong, Kaupena
DECEASED
Cooke, George P. Morris, Penrose
Houston, Victor S. K. Steadman, Mrs. Alva E.
Marx, Benjamin L. Walker, Charles D.
58
SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS
Members of the Society are entitled to receive the current
Annual Reports and to purchase all publications at one third
discount.
Non-members receive one third discount on bulk purchases
of $15.00 or more.
Sets from 1893 to date, except for a few missing numbers
which are out of print, can be made up. Address inquiries to
the Librarian, P. O. Box 2596, Honolulu 3, Hawaii, or telephone
57-271.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Through the kindness of the author, the Society is privileged
to offer:
Na Himeni Hawaii, by Ethel M. Damon, for $1.00.
MEMBERSHIP DUES
Life Member $100
Sustaining Member 25 a year
Contributing Member 10 a year
Regular Member 5 a year
Make checks payable to The Hawaiian Historical Society and mail to
P. O. Box 2596, Honolulu 3, Hawaii.
Names of persons whose dues are in arrears by more than one year do not
appear in the Membership List. Reinstatement may be effected by contacting
the Membership Committee.



